Abstract. Anonymous authentication schemes such as group signatures and anonymous credentials are important privacy-protecting tools in electronic communications. The only currently known scheme based on assumptions that resist quantum attacks is the group signature scheme by Gordon et al. (ASIACRYPT 2010). We present a generalization of group signatures called anonymous attribute tokens where users are issued attribute-containing credentials that they can use to anonymously sign messages and generate tokens revealing only a subset of their attributes. We present two lattice-based constructions of this new primitive, one with and one without opening capabilities for the group manager. The latter construction directly yields as a special case the first lattice-based group signature scheme offering full anonymity (in the random-oracle model), as opposed to the practically less relevant notion of chosen-plaintext anonymity offered by the scheme of Gordon et al. We also extend our scheme to protect users from framing attacks by the group manager, where the latter creates tokens or signatures in the name of honest users. Our constructions involve new lattice-based tools for aggregating signatures and verifiable CCA2-secure encryption.
Introduction
We all increasingly use electronic services in our daily lives. To do so, we currently have no choice but to provide plenty of personal information for authorization, billing purposes, or as part of the terms and conditions of service providers. Dispersing all these personal information erodes our privacy and puts us at risk of abuse of this information by criminals. Therefore, these services and their authentication mechanisms should be built in a way that minimizes the disclosed personal information. For instance, to access a resource, users should not need to identify themselves but rather only to prove to the resource provider that they possess the necessary attributes (e.g., rights or properties) which are required for the access. In fact, in Europe it is widely acknowledged that to secure the future digital infrastructure one must employ this kind of attribute-based access control and use so-called attribute-based credentials or minimal disclose tokens (see, e.g., [RIS10, IA11] ).
The cryptographic research literature has put forth a large body of protocols that allow for privacy-friendly access control. For instance, group signature [CvH91] and identity escrow [KP98] schemes allow a user to prove that she has authorization (i.e., is member of a group of people who all share the same property) without revealing her identity. Nevertheless, in case of abuse of this anonymity, group signature and identity escrow schemes allow a designated party to lift the anonymity and to identify the abusing user. The generalization of these schemes are anonymous credentials or pseudonym systems [Cha81, Bra99, CL01b, LRSW99] . Such schemes feature a plurality of organizations who assign attributes to users by issuing attribute-containing credentials. Users are known to the different issuers under different pseudonyms. Later, when users need to authenticate somewhere, they can do so in the most privacy-protecting manner, i.e., users can just prove that they possess credentials asserting them the attributes required by the authentication policy.
It is well known that the cryptographic assumptions underlying all known realizations of these privacy-protecting schemes can be broken with quantum computers. The only exception to this is the group signature scheme by Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [GKV10] . Their scheme works on ordinary computers but is based on the hardness of lattice problems, which are believed to be immune to quantum computers. While so far only small quantum computers breaking toy keys could be built, it seems very plausible that in just a few years computers breaking currently used keys can be built [Los10] . Even if quantum computers are not considered an immediate threat, the hardness of lattice problems against sub-exponential time adversaries and their provable worst-case to average-case relation makes it desirable to build cryptographic schemes from these problems.
In this paper we provide a number of new schemes for privacy-protecting authentication with security based on lattice problems in the random-oracle model. In particular, as our first contribution, we define and present an anonymous attribute token scheme without anonymity revocation (AAT-R). Here, a user can obtain a credential from a group manager or issuer, the credential containing the attributes that the manager wants to assert to the user. Later, the user can anonymously authenticate to a verifier by generating an authentication token from her credential, the token revealing only a subset of the attributes that are contained in the credential. Such authentication tokens are anonymous, i.e., a token containing a set of attributes could originate from any user who has been asserted a superset of these attributes. Minimal disclosure tokens as implemented by Microsoft's U-Prove [BP10] are an example of an AAT-R scheme.
As our second and main contribution, we extend our scheme to an anonymous attribute token scheme with anonymity revocation (AAT+R), where the group manager additionally has the power to reveal the identity of the user who generated a given token. Group signatures can be seen as special case of AAT+R schemes where the manager issues to all users a credential without attributes (or a single attribute with a fixed value). Our scheme provides anonymity to honest users in the presence of adversaries with adaptive access to the opening functionality. This is a major improvement over the group signature scheme of Gordon et al., who provide a much weaker form of anonymity. In their model, anonymity may break down for all users in the system as soon as a single signature (or token in our terminology) is opened, even for users who never misbehaved and never had their tokens opened. Hence, their scheme can only be used as long as no signature (token) is opened-an event that users are typically not even aware of. This is a severe limitation that we overcome.
We furthermore show how our AAT-R and AAT+R schemes can be combined to obtain a new AAT+R scheme that protects users from framing by a dishonest group manager. That is, in this resulting third scheme, no one except the user herself can produce tokens that when opened will be attributed to the user. This is a further property that the Gordon et al. group signature scheme does not provide and which we believe is rather important when one wants to have accountability. Group signatures obtained from our AAT+R schemes do not only provide better security compared to the Gordon et al. scheme, but also offer other advantages: the manager's public and secret key are independent of the number of users (versus linear in their scheme 1 ) and users can join dynamically (in theirs, all the users' keys need to be generated at setup time). Thus, while our main focus is on anonymous attribute token schemes, we present as a corollary the first lattice-based, non-frameable group signature scheme with full anonymity.
As an aside, to construct our scheme, we improve upon known tools and introduce a number of new building blocks, which we believe are of interest in their own right. We provide a verifiable encryption proof protocol for the CCA2-secure encryption scheme of Peikert [Pei09] and introduce and construct single-signer aggregate signatures as a restricted, but useful, form of aggregate signatures [BGLS03] .
Related Work. We do not claim anonymous attribute token to be a new primitive: the U-Prove scheme [BP10] and the signature scheme with its proof protocols by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL04] actually realize instantiations of it based on the discrete logarithm assumption and the strong RSA assumption, respectively. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, an anonymous attribute token scheme (with or without anonymity revocation) has never been formally defined. As we have pointed out already, group signature schemes can be seen as a special case of AAT+R schemes.
Several group signature schemes have been proposed in the literature. Most of these are based on strong RSA [ACJT00, AST02, CL01a] or on bilinear maps [BBS04,BS04,CL04,DP06,BCN + 10]. The scheme due to Gordon et al. [GKV10] is the only based on assumptions that resist attacks by quantum computers.
Attribute-based signatures [MPR11] are a related primitive where signatures cannot be opened and where the signer can prove any predicate over the attributes that can be expressed as a monotone span program, which includes circuits of threshold gates. Attribute-based group signatures [Kha07] are a similar primitive where signatures can be opened by a dedicated authority, and is thereby closely related to our notion of AAT+R schemes. Unfortunately, however, the security notions proposed in [Kha07] are flawed. 2 Ring signatures [ST01] are another privacy-enabling primitive which can be seen as an adhoc group signature scheme without a central group manager and without the possibility for anonymity revocation. Ring signatures can also be constructed from our AAT-R scheme, as we shall point out later.
The most general privacy-enabling primitive are probably anonymous credential systems with additional features such as proving predicates over attributes, cryptographic pseudonyms, and partially blind issuing protocols to protect users against framing attacks by malicious issuers. While they are quite close to anonymous attribute token schemes, we leave it as an open problem to construct a full-fledged anonymous credential system based on lattices.
Organization of the Paper. After a brief preliminary section, we define anonymous attribute token schemes in Section 3. Then, we introduce, analyze, and discuss the building blocks for our constructions in Section 4, followed by our constructions in Section 4.2. Based on these results, we describe how to achieve group signatures and restricted anonymous credential systems in Section 6. There, we also discuss open research problems before we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
The statement x ← $ X means that x is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set X. A function is negligible if it vanishes faster than 1/p(n) for any polynomial p. All logarithms are base 2 and we identify {1, . . . , k} with [k] and (
, we simply write a ≡ b. When we write " ", we mean the concatenation of strings or matrix columns. The concatenation of two vectors x, y is denoted [x, y]. The notation #S denotes the cardinality of a finite set S.
In this work, we only require full-rank lattices. A lattice in R n is a discrete subgroup
The matrix B is a basis of the lattice Λ and we write Λ = Λ(B). The number of linearly independent vectors in B is the dimension dim(Λ). For a lattice Λ(B) with B ∈ Z n×n define the (full-rank) dual lattice as the set of all x ∈ R n with x, y ∈ Z for all y ∈ Λ(B). The One of the main computational problems in lattices is the approximate shortest vector problem (SVP). Given a basis B of Λ and an approximation factor γ ≥ 1, the task is to find a non-zero vector v ∈ Λ with length at most γ times the length of a shortest vector in Λ. A related problem is the approximate shortest independent vector problem (SIVP), where one is supposed to find a set {v 1 , . . . , v n } of linearly independent vectors in Λ such that max i v i 2 ≤ γλ n . Here, λ n denotes the n-th successive minimum of Λ, which is the smallest radius of a sphere that contains n linearly independent lattice vectors. For polynomial (in the dimension) approximation factors, which are relevant for cryptography, the best known algorithms require exponential space × time, e.g., [MV10] .
In cryptography, we use lattices of a special form, which we call q-ary lattices:
Its, up to scaling, dual lattice Λ q (A) is defined as {w ∈ Z m : ∃e ∈ Z n s.t. A t e ≡ w}. The main computational problem in Λ ⊥ q (A) is the following "short integer solution" (SIS) problem: given n, m, q, uniformly random A, and a norm bound 1 ≤ ν < q, find v ∈ Λ ⊥ q (A) with 0 < v 2 ≤ ν. The SIS problem was introduced and analyzed by Ajtai [Ajt96] but there are numerous improvements to the analysis [MR07, GPV08] . We will also use the (equivalent) inhomogeneous problem ISIS, where the task is to find a short vector x that solves Ax ≡ y given y. For ν ≤ poly(n), prime q ≥ νg(n) for g(n) = ω( n log(n)), and m ≥ 2n log(q), the average-case SIS(n, m, q, ν) is at least as hard as SIVP with γ = ν O( √ n) in the worst case. For Λ q (A), we consider the following "learning with errors" (LWE) problem: given n, m, q, A, and m "noisy" inner products b ≡ A t s + e mod q, where e is chosen from a certain error distribution Ψ over Z m . The task is to recover s ∈ Z n q . This search version of LWE is at least as hard as solving the decision problem, i.e., distinguish (A, b) from uniform. The standard error distribution is a spherical discretized normal distribution Ψ m α with width parameter to α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1). For prime q > 2 √ n/α and m ≤ poly(n), these problems are, on the average, at least as hard as SIVP with γ = O(n/α) in the worst case [Reg09] under a quantum reduction. A similar classical reduction can be found in [Pei09] at the expense of more constraints. We will use a different, true discrete Gaussian error distribution as defined below.
Gentry et al. [GPV08] define a special type of one-way trapdoor function called a preimage samplable function. For parameters n ∈ N, q = q(n) = poly(n), m = m(n) = Ω(n log(q)), L =L(n) = O(n log(n)), ρ(n) = ω( log(n)), and η ≥Lρ(m) this one-way trapdoor function is defined as follows.
-GPVGen(1 n ) generates a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , distributed statistically close to uniform, and a secret trapdoor T ∈ Z m×m such that AT ≡ 0 and T ≤L.
-The one-way function associated to A is f A :
A (y) so that (x, Ax (mod q)) as well as (GPVInvert(A, T, y, η), y) are statistically close for x ∼ D Z m ,η and y ← $ Z n q for a certain distribution D, defined below.
-The samples x returned by GPVInvert have a conditional min-entropy of ω(log(n)), conditioned on Ax ≡ y and
Let Λ be a lattice. We define the distribution D Λ,η,c with parameter η as in [GPV08] : for all
Note that, as in [GKV10] , this distribution will serve as an error distribution for LWE later.
Theorem 1 ([GPV08]). The family is collision-resistant if
The GPV signature scheme [GPV08] is essentially a full-domain hash scheme [BR93] based on this one-way function. It uses A as a public key and the trapdoor T as the signing key. A signature on message M is a vector σ such that Aσ ≡ H(M ) and σ 2 ≤ η √ m which can be computed using the probabilistic GPVInvert algorithm. 3 Signing is stateful, i.e., when the same message is signed twice, the same signature is returned.
Syntax and Security of Anonymous Attribute Tokens
An anonymous attribute token (AAT) scheme can be seen as an extension of group signatures or as a simplification of anonymous credentials where the issuer can assign a list of attributes to a user's signing key. When authenticating to a verifier, the user can selectively reveal some of these attributes in a token and convince the verifier that she has a valid credential (i.e., signing key with attributes) certifying the claimed attribute values, without revealing any information about the non-revealed attributes and without making her tokens linkable -that is, more linkable than directly implied by the revealed attributes. We define and design two kind of schemes: AAT without anonymity revocation (AAT-R) where anonymity is absolute, i.e., opening tokens is impossible, even for the issuer; and AAT with anonymity revocation (AAT+R), where the manager can uncover the user who created a given token. Minimal disclosure tokens as implemented by Microsoft's U-Prove [BP10] are an example of an AAT-R scheme.
Our syntax and security definitions take inspiration from those for group signatures as put forward by Bellare et al. [BMW03] , but we add support for dynamic issuing of credentials. We first lay out the definitions for the revocable anonymity setting (AAT+R), and then explain the differences to the AAT-R setting. We note that an AAT+R scheme does not trivially yield an AAT-R scheme, because in the former the manager can always open tokens, while the latter requires that even the manager cannot link tokens. The inverse relation does not hold either due to the lack of an opening algorithm in AAT-R schemes.
Syntax of AAT+R schemes. An AAT+R scheme is parameterized by security parameter n, maximum number of users u max , and maximum number of attributes per credential max , and is defined by the following algorithms.
-The manager runs MKeyGen on 1 n , u max to generate his public key mpk and corresponding secret key msk . -When a user with index u requests a credential for an ordered list of attribute values (a i ) i=1 , with ≤ max , the manager runs Issue on input msk , u, and (a i ) i=1 to generate a credential cred . -A user generates an authentication token τ revealing a subset of attribute values (a i ) i∈R for R ⊆ [ ] and authenticating a message M by running the GenToken algorithm on input mpk , cred , (a i ) i=1 , R, and M . The message M can be any string; in practice, it could encode authentication context information such as the identity of the verifier, a timestamp, a session identifier, or a random nonce. -To verify a token, the verifier runs the VToken algorithm on input mpk , the token τ , the set R, the revealed attribute values (a i ) i∈R , and the message M . It outputs 1 or 0, indicating the validity of τ . -Using the Open algorithm on input msk , a token τ , a set R, the revealed attributes (a i ) i∈R , and a message M , the manager recovers the index u of the user that generated the token.
Correctness is defined in the straightforward way that any honestly generated token will be accepted. Security consists of anonymity, requiring that tokens generated by the same user cannot be linked, and traceability, requiring that no adversary can produce a token that cannot be opened or that, when opened, falsely incriminates an honest user.
Anonymity of AAT+R schemes. We consider full anonymity here, in other works (e.g., [BBS04] ) often referred to as CCA2-anonymity, where the adversary has access to an opening oracle. The adversary A is given the manager's public key mpk as input. It has access to an initialization oracle, an issuing oracle, and an opening oracle, which offer the following functionalities.
-The initialization oracle, on input user index u and attribute values (
The oracle does not generate any direct output to A, but stores cred u locally, outside A's view. It can only be queried once for each user u. Once user u has been initialized, the adversary can query the issuing and token generation oracles for u. -The issuing oracle, on input a user index u, returns cred u if a credential for u was previously initialized, or ⊥ otherwise. -The opening oracle, on input token τ , attribute indices R ⊆ [ ], attribute values (a i ) i∈R and message M , returns u ← Open(msk , τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ).
At the end of the first phase, A outputs user indices
be the attributes with which u 0 and u 1 were associated by the initialization oracle, respectively. If one of u 0 or u 1 has not been initialized, or if a i,0 = a i,1 from some i ∈ R, then A loses the game. Otherwise, the challenger chooses a random bit b, generates a token
, R, M ) and hands it to A. The latter is allowed to make any additional oracle queries except submitting τ * to the opening oracle. Eventually it outputs a bit b and wins the game if b = b.
Traceability of AAT+R schemes. The adversary A is given as input the manager's public key mpk . Apart from the initialization, issuing, and opening oracles described above, it has access to a token generation oracle offering the following functionality.
-The token generation oracle, on input user index u, attribute indices R ⊆ [ ], and message M , returns a token τ ← $ GenToken(mpk , cred u , (a i ) i=1 , R, M ) and returns τ to the adversary if a credential for u was previously initialized, or returns ⊥ otherwise.
At the end of the game, A outputs τ * , R * , (a * i ) i∈R * , and M * . Let u * ← Open(msk , τ * , R * , (a * i ) i∈R * , M * ) be the index of the user to whom the token is attributed by the opening algorithm. The adversary wins the game if VToken(mpk , ipk , R * , (a * i ) i∈R * , M * ) = 1 and either -A initialized u * with attributes (a i ) i=1 such that a i = a * i for some i ∈ R * , or -A never queried the issuing oracle on u * and never queried a token by u * on M * and R * .
Syntax and security of AAT-R schemes. An AAT-R scheme does not have an Open algorithm. It does, however, have an additional VCred algorithm that a user runs, upon receiving a credential cred , on input mpk , cred , (a i ) i=1 , to check whether cred is a well-formed credential. The algorithm returns 1 in case it is well-formed, or 0 if not.
We define a stronger anonymity notion for AAT-R than for AAT+R. The adversary A is given the manager's keys mpk and msk as input. At the end of the first phase, A outputs user
or if a i,0 = a i,1 from some i ∈ R, then A loses the game. Otherwise, the challenger chooses a random bit b, generates a token
, R, M ) and hands it to A. The latter outputs a bit b and wins the game if b = b.
The traceability notion for AAT+R is replaced with the notion of unforgeability for AAT-R. In the unforgeability experiment, the adversary is given mpk as input. It has access to the same initialization, issuing, and token generation oracles as in the traceability game above. The adversary wins the game if VToken(mpk , τ * , R * , (a * i ) i∈R * , M * ) = 1 and if for all users u initialized with attributes (a i ) i=1 such that a i = a * i for all i ∈ R * , A never queried the issuing oracle on u and never queried a token for u, M * , R * .
An Anonymous Attribute Token Scheme without Revocation
Our anonymous attribute token schemes build upon techniques in the GKV group signature scheme by Gordon et al. [GKV10] . We briefly recall their scheme and explain the fundamental differences in the way we issue credentials (signing keys) and generate tokens (signatures). In the GKV scheme, each user u is assigned a matrix A u as public key and a corresponding trapdoor matrix T u as signing key. To group-sign a message M , user u first uses T u to compute a GPV signature [GPV08] σ u on M , this GPV-signature being a short vector such that A u σ u ≡ H(M ), where H is a hash function. She generates a "fake" GPV-signature σ v for all other users v = u through Gaussian elimination, i.e., σ v will be a long vector such that A v σ v ≡ H(M ). She subsequently encrypts each of these signatures using a variant of the Regev encryption scheme [Reg09] to obtain ciphertexts τ v = B v s + σ v for v = 1, . . . , u max , where B v are matrices such that A v B t v ≡ 0 and which are included in the group's public key. The encrypted GPV-signatures can still be verified by checking whether or not A v τ v ≡ H(M ) holds. The group signature contains the vectors τ 1 , . . . , τ umax plus a non-interactive witnessindistinguishable proof [MV03] that at least one of the encrypted GPV-signatures is actually short. Group signatures can be opened by decrypting τ v using a trapdoor S v associated to B v and checking which of the signatures σ v is short.
Our AAT-R scheme uses only a single pair of matrices A, B for the entire group, as opposed to a pair of matrices for each user. Only the manager knows the trapdoor T corresponding to A. To prevent anyone, including the manager, from knowing a trapdoor corresponding to B, the latter matrix is determined by a common reference string. The credential of a user u is a list of GPV signatures σ u,i such that Aσ u,i ≡ H(u i a i ). A first idea to create a token for attribute a i and message M could be to encrypt σ u,i as in the GKV scheme and include M as an argument to the random oracle in the non-interactive proof that one of the ciphertexts τ v encrypts a short vector.
The problem with this approach, however, is that two signatures by the same user u can be linked by checking whether τ u − τ u is a lattice point. This can be fixed by re-randomizing the GPV signatures, for both real and fake ones, with a small short random x ∼ D Z m+n ,η . To enable verifiability, we compute y ← Ax mod q and append a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge of a short vector x such that Ax ≡ y. This proof is the Fiat-Shamir transformation of a generalization of Lyubashevsky's identification scheme [Lyu08a] , where the message M is included as an argument in the hash.
signatures is short. This approach of treating each attribute separately has the obvious disadvantage that it blows up the signature size with a factor of #R ≤ . We can obtain shorter tokens by observing that GPV signatures support a limited form of aggregation [BGLS03] . Namely, the GPV signatures σ u,i for i ∈ R can be summed up to form an aggregate signature α u ← i∈R σ u,i . The aggregate satisfies Aα u ≡ i∈R H(u i a i ) and is still "somewhat" short. Enabling such aggregation in Section 4.1.4 comes at the price of having to choose slightly larger security parameters, but only by a factor of log(#R).
Cryptographic Ingredients
4.1.1 Sampling Orthogonal Lattices with Trapdoors Revisited. Gordon et al. [GKV10] present an algorithm that, given a matrix B ∈ Z n×(m+n) q , samples a matrix A ∈ Z n×(m+n) q and an associated trapdoor T ∈ Z n×(m+n) such that AB t ≡ 0. We give a construction method based on [GKV10] that is more efficient and allows for better (i.e., shorter) trapdoors.
Proposition 1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm
A is distributed statistically close to uniform (conditioned on AB t ≡ 0); (3) AT ≡ 0; and (4) T ≤L.
From [CHKP10]
, we adopt the notion of extending a lattices basis to a larger dimension. The corresponding algorithm ExtBasis takes as input a matrix A 1 , a basis T 1 of Λ ⊥ q (A 1 ), and an extension A 2 . It picks a uniformly random
n ] and compute the basis
Thus, after GSO, we arrive atT = T 1 0 0 I n and, in consequence, have T = T 1 ≤L.
Notice that essentially the same procedure can be used to compute an orthogonal A such that AB t ≡ 0 without a trapdoor for Λ ⊥ q (A). Just sample a uniformly random matrix A 1 in the first step and omit all subsequent steps that involve the trapdoor T 1 .
In our security proofs, we will require that a pair (A, T A , B, T B ) does not reveal in which order they were generated by OrthoSamp as stated by the following proposition. The proof is given in Appendix A.
be random variables where
and
Then, X 1 and X 2 are statistically indistinguishable.
Observe that we have applied a simplification to the above proposition, where we choose B 2 and C 2 directly from the set of invertible matrices. Whenever the proposition is applied in our schemes, this property can be easily ensured by repeating the sampling procedure a small number of times. For our parameters, a good approximation of the ratio (Z n×n q ) * / Z n×n q is e −1/(q−1) and a lower bound is (1 − 1/q) n . Since the choice of q is mainly governed by the worstcase to average-case reduction for SIS, demanding that q ν for SIS(n, m, q, ν), it will exceed η √ m + n = Ω(n 1.5 log 1.5 (n)) in all our schemes. Hence, the fraction of invertible matrices over Z n×n q is very close to 1. All in all, our method differs from the corresponding lemma of [GKV10] in that we always use GPVGen in dimension m instead of sampling a trapdoor in dimension m + n (as in [GKV10] ) directly. Instead, we explicitly control how the trapdoor is extended to the super lattice. Hence, we have more control over the "shape" of the (m+n)-dimensional input trapdoor to OrthoSamp.
Our sampling algorithm differs from that of [GKV10] in that there, the trapdoor T is constructed via the basis randomizer RandBasis of Cash et al. [CHKP10] . It entails extending T 1 to a basis for Λ ⊥ q (A), sampling (via GPVInvert) a set of Ω((m + n) 2 ) short vectors from the lattice Λ ⊥ q (A), a computation of the Hermite Normal Form, and the ToBasis algorithm of [MG02, Lemma 7.1]. Here, we simply append an easily computable matrix V to T 1 , which has two advantages. First, our method with complexity O(nm 2 ) is more efficient than [GKV10] , where the complexity is dominated by Ω((m + n) 4 ) for sampling (m + n) 2 lattice vectors using [Pei10] . Second, the quality of the trapdoor in [GKV10] 
. We have T =L, which allows tighter security proofs w.r.t. the SIS problem. However, we do not obtain a nice bound on T , which does not matter for most applications because they apply Babai's Nearest Plane algorithm [Bab86] or variants thereof [GPV08, Kle00] , which only rely on T being small. Efficient Sampling with Orthogonal Trapdoors. We apply a slight, well-known improvement to GPVInvert whenever we apply it in dimension m + n, i.e., whenever we call GPVInvert(A, T, t, η) for (A, T) being output by OrthoSamp. Instead of sampling directly using T, we use the upper-left part T 1 of T and the following algorithm:
The result has norm at most η √ m + n.
Verifiable Encryption of GPV Signatures.
As mentioned in the construction sketch, we will "encrypt" GPV signatures with a variant of the "dual" encryption scheme [GPV08] .
To this end, we define the following family of one-way trapdoor functions based on the LWE problem. For ease of exposition, we will slightly abuse the terms encryption for this trapdoor one-way function and ciphertext for an image under this trapdoor in the subsequent sections. Fix a truncated error distribution Ψ over Z m with support D Ψ . Other parameters are the same as for GPV signatures.
-Keys are generated using GPVGen(1 n ), yielding a public key B and corresponding trapdoor S. -The one-way function associated to B is g B : Z n q × Z m → Z m q : (s, e) → B t s + e mod q. -LWEInvert(B, S, τ ) uses S to find a vector B t s that is close to τ . Then, it computes e ← τ − B t s and returns (s , e ).
Note that we modified LWEInvert() as to output (s , e ) instead of just s as defined by Peikert [Pei09] . We will use
Correctness follows from [Pei09] with q(n) ≥L 2 ρ 2 (m), security as a one-way function follows from [Reg09, Pei09, GKV10] .
Theorem 2 ([GKV10]).
The family is one-way if g B (s, e) is indistinguishable from uniform for s ← $ Z n q and e ∼ Ψ . It is hard to distinguish from uniform for Ψ if decision LWE is hard with the standard noise distribution Ψ m
.
Also note that if matrices B, A, S are generated via the GPVGen and OrthoSamp and σ is a GPV signature such that Aσ ≡ H(M ), then the "encrypted" signature τ ← B t s + σ mod q can still be verified by checking that Aτ ≡ H(M ). However, we need to ensure that the "noise" σ is small, which is why we require the following witness-indistinguishable proof of membership (WIPoM) system for bounded-distance decodeability (BDD).
Efficient Proofs for Lattice Problems.
As mentioned in the construction sketch, we need two non-interactive proofs for our scheme: a proof that at least one of a number of ciphertexts encrypts a short vector, and a proof of knowledge of x such that Ax ≡ y.
for lattices Λ q (B). The "YES" and "NO" instances for words (B, τ ) ∈ Z n×m q × Z m q are defined as:
The norms above are computed by taking the absolute smallest representative modulo q of the coordinates, i.e., integers in the interval [
2 ]. Micciancio and Vadhan [MV03] proposed a statistically zero-knowledge proof of membership (P BDD , V BDD ) with one-bit challenges, together with a simulator S BDD that on input B, τ produces a transcript (cmt, ch, rsp). The k-bit parallelized proof system (P pBDD , V pBDD ) is still statistical honest-verifier zero-knowledge, as the simulator S pBDD can generate n conversations using S BDD and output the concatenation of all transcripts. The corresponding proof of membership requires O(n) bits of communication for all γ = Ω( √ n), using k = ω(log(n)) for a negligible soundness error [MV03] . Using standard techniques [CDS94, MV03, SCPY08] , one can efficiently convert (P pBDD , V pBDD ) into a sound WIPoM (P ∨-pBDD , V ∨-pBDD ) for the OR-combination of such statements:
The "NO" instance is defined analogously. The resulting prover P ∨-pBDD generates simulated transcripts by running S pBDD (B, τ v ) for all v = u and runs the real prover P pBDD ((B, τ u ), s u ) to obtain the transcript for user u, using as a challenge the XOR of the given challenge of the P ∨-pBDD proof and the simulated challenges for v = u. This proof system is also statistical honest-verifier zero-knowledge since the simulator S ∨-pBDD can generate correctly distributed conversation transcripts by generating u max transcripts using S pBDD (B, τ v ) and setting the main challenge to be the XOR of the challenges in the generated transcripts. We will use the noninteractive variant of the proof system using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86] where the challenge ch ∨ is generated through a random oracle.
Signatures from ISIS. In addition, our constructions will require a signature scheme based on a generalized version of the witness-indistinguishable identification scheme due to Lyubashevsky [Lyu08a] that we recall and generalize in Appendix C. The main difference to [Lyu08a] is that we require an entirely different distribution of secret keys to make the scheme applicable in our context. To be more precise, the format of these keys plays a crucial role in ensuring anonymity.
The secret key is a short vector x ∼ D Z m+n ,η , while the public key consists of a matrix A ← $ Z n×(m+n) and the vector y ← Ax mod q. It follows a typical three-move structure where the prover first generates a commitment and internal state (cmt ISIS , st) ← $ Comm ISIS (A) and sends cmt ISIS to the verifier. The verifier then chooses and sends back a challenge ch ISIS ← $ {0, 1} t , upon which the prover sends the response rsp ISIS ← $ Resp ISIS (x, st, ch ISIS ). The verifier accepts iff Verify ISIS (A, y, cmt ISIS , ch ISIS , rsp ISIS ) = 1. The protocol has a non-zero completeness error, i.e., probability of rejecting an honest prover, of at most 2 −t/14 , which is negligible for t = ω(log(n)).
The identification scheme has been shown statistically witness-indistinguishable and secure under active attack assuming that the ISIS problem related to A, y is hard [Lyu08a, Theorem 13]. The latter property is proved through a rewinding argument that from two valid tran-
We will turn the identification scheme into a signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Note that the non-zero completeness error is less of an issue for signatures, as the signer can always generate a new signature in the unlikely event that an invalid signature is generated.
4.1.4 Single-Signer Aggregate Signatures. To make the token length logarithmic 4 instead of linear the number of attributes, we observe that GPV signatures support a restricted form of aggregation [BGLS03] where up to max signatures by the same signer can be compressed to the size of a single signature. Namely, given ≤ max signatures (σ i ) i=1 , the aggregate α ← i=1 σ i can be verified by checking that ≤ max , that 0 < α 2 ≤ η √ m, and that Aα ≡ i=1 H(M i ). Because of the similarity in structure between GPV signatures and the above single-signer aggregate scheme, the latter inherits the mechanisms to verifiably encrypt aggregate signatures from Section 4.1.2. A more detailed description and a proof of the following theorem can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. The above single-signer aggregate signature scheme is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model if the SIS(n, m, q, 2 max η √ m) problem is hard.
Scheme and Security
In the following, we describe an anonymous attribute token scheme AAT-R = (IKeyGen, Issue, GenToken, VToken) with security parameter n based on hard lattice problems. The scheme uses random oracles H : {0, 1} * → Z m+n q , F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k , and G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} t , as well as a uniformly distributed common reference string B ∈ Z n×(m+n) q that is a valid input to OrthoSamp.
MKeyGen(1 n , u max ): The manager runs (A, T) ← OrthoSamp(B) and sets mpk ← A and msk ← (A, T).
The user parses cred = (u, (σ i ) i=1 ) and outputs 1 iff Aσ u,i ≡ H(u i a i ) and (τ 1 , . . . , τ umax , y, cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS , cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ ). VToken(mpk , τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ): The verifier accepts a token if Verify ISIS (A, y, 
Proof (sketch). Using the hardness of the decision LWE problem and the statistical zero-knowledge property of the proof system for BDD, we show that the adversary's view is independent of the coin flip b ← $ {0, 1} in the experiment. We achieve this in a series of indistinguishable games, with the first game being the anonymity experiment for b = 0 and the last one being the same experiment with b = 1. The overall strategy is as follows. We generate all keys honestly and pass them to adversary, who responds with two user indices u 0 , u 1 ∈ [u max ], credentials cred u 0 , cred u 1 , and requests a token for u b . Now, instead of using just the short vectors in cred u 0 to generate and return a token, we modify the experiment to eventually use cred u 0 and cred u 1 to create a token with two vectors that are close the Λ q (B).
The assumptions are used in the following way. When replacing the vector τ u 1 ← B t s u 1 + x +α u 1 mod q (far from Λ q (B)) with a vector τ u 1 ← B t s u 1 + x + α u 1 mod q (close to Λ q (B)), the underlying argument uses the decision LWE assumption to establish computational indistinguishability. Then, when switching from using a witness for u 0 to using a witness for u 1 , we exploit the statistical witness-indistinguishability of the proof system for BDD in Λ q (B).
Theorem 5. The above anonymous attribute token scheme is unforgeable in the random oracle model if SIS(n, m + n, q, (2 max + 1)η √ m + n + O(n 1.5 )) is hard and the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard.
Proof (sketch). We simulate the issuing oracle without knowing a trapdoor for Λ ⊥ q (A) in the standard way, i.e., by generating random short GPV signatures and programming the random oracle H. Rather than generating tokens based on these signatures, we compute long vectors that satisfy the verification equation; the tokens thus obtained are indistinguishable from tokens generated by short vectors if the decision LWE problem is hard. We simulate the BDD proof without a witness using the simulator S ∨-pBDD and by programming the random oracle F. As a consequence, the adversary's view is independent of the stored GPV signatures of uncorrupted users.
To use the forged token τ * to solve the SIS problem, we change the way the manager's keys are generated by taking A from the SIS problem instance, generating (B, S) ← OrthoSamp(A), and programming the common reference string that defines B. The matrix A is an admissible input to OrthoSamp with high probability and the argument only requires a non-negligible fraction of matrices A to work. By Proposition 2, this change in how keys are generated does not affect the adversary's view. Using B, we can "decrypt" the vectors τ * v included in τ * and, by the soundness of V ∨-pBDD , we can recover a user index u * and a short vector ρ such that Aρ ≡ i∈R * H(u * i a * i ) + y * . Then, we use the knowledge extractor for (cmt * ISIS , rsp * ISIS ) in τ * to extract a short vector x such that matAx ≡ y * . The vector α ← ρ − x is therefore also short and a solution to Aα ≡ i∈R * H(u * i a * i ). The simulator internally knows a second vector α satisfying the same conditions, namely the sum of the stored GPV signatures, which with overwhelming probability is different from α since the adversary's view is independent of the stored signatures. Therefore, α − α is a short vector for Λ ⊥ q (A).
An Anonymous Attribute Token Scheme with Revocation
To add opening functionality to the AAT-R scheme of the previous section, we generate the matrix B with an embedded trapdoor S using OrthoSamp, as done in [GKV10] . To achieve full anonymity, however, we need to be able to respond to opening queries. For this purpose, we borrow techniques from Rosen and Segev [RS09] and Peikert [Pei09] to obtain CCA-security for the LWE encryption scheme by using "correlated" ciphertexts. One problem is that the verifier needs a way to check that the included ciphertexts are valid, i.e., correctly correlated, without having the trapdoor S. We solve this problem by a clever use of the P ∨-pBDD proof system so that it simultaneously proves that a ciphertext contains a short vector and is correctly correlated.
Cryptographic Ingredients
Correlated trapdoor one-way functions. Following Rosen and Segev [RS09] and Peikert [Pei09] , we define the following family of correlated trapdoor one-way functions CTLWE with parameters n, m, κ ∈ N. √ m for all i ∈ {0, . . . , κ} then it returns (s , e 0 , . . . , e κ ), else it returns ⊥. The norm of e i is computed in a natural way by first selecting the absolute smallest representative first.
If the above function family is evaluated on uniformly random s ← $ Z n and e i ∼ Ψ , then g (B 0 ,...,Bκ) (s, e 0 , . . . , e κ ) is indistinguishable from random if LWE is hard for Ψ [RS09,Pei09].
One-time signatures. A one-time signature scheme OT S is a triple of algorithms (OTKeygen, OTSign, OTVerify) where OTKeygen(1 n ) outputs a verification key otvk ∈ {0, 1} κ and a signing key otsk ; algorithm OTSign(otsk , M ) outputs a signature otsig, and OTVerify(otvk , M, otsig) outputs 1 or 0 indicating whether the signature is valid. The security notion of strong existential unforgeability under one-time chosen-message attack requires that no adversary, on input otvk and after a single signature query M yielding otsig ← $ OTSign(otsk , M ), can output M * , otsig * such that OTVerify(otvk , M * , otsig * ) = 1 and (M * , otsig * ) = (M, otsig).
Scheme and Security
We now describe fully anonymous AAT+R scheme with the same parameters n, u max , t, m as the AAT-R scheme from Section 4.2, plus the signature length κ. The scheme uses random oracles H : {0, 1} * → Z m+n q , F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k and G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} t .
MKeyGen(1 n , u max ): The manager runs CTGen(1 n , 1 m , 1 κ ) to generate matrices ((B 0 , B 1,0 . . . , B κ,0 ), S 0 ) and generates κ additional random matrices B 1,1 , . . . , B κ,1 ← $ Z n×(m+n) q . He also runs (A, T) ← OrthoSamp(B 0 ). The public key is mpk ← (A, B 0 , B 1,0 , B 1,1 , . . . , B κ,0 , B κ,1 ), the secret key is msk ← (T, S 0 , mpk ). If B 0 is not accepted by OrthoSamp, it is re-sampled.
The user u proceeds as follows:
1. She chooses x 0 ∼ D Z m+n ,η , computes y 0 ← Ax 0 mod q, and creates a signature (cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS ) using ch ISIS = G(y 0 cmt ISIS M ) as the challenge. 2. She computes ρ u ← i∈R σ u,i + x 0 mod q, chooses s u ← $ Z n q and computes τ u,0 ← B t 0 s u + ρ u mod q. 3. For all v ∈ [u max ] \ {u}, she computesα v such that Aα v ≡ i∈R H(v i a i ) using Gauss elimination, computes ρ v ←α v + x 0 mod q, chooses s v ← $ Z n q and computes τ v,0 ← B t 0 s v + ρ v mod q. 4. She generates a signature key pair (otvk , otsk ) ← OTKeygen(1 n ). Let otvk = otvk 1 . . . 
Let
otvk s v + x v , and for user u we have that x u 2 ≤ (#R + κ + 1)η √ m + n. The signer can therefore create a non-interactive proof (cmt
as a challenge to simultaneously prove that one of the vectors τ v encrypts a short vector α v and that all ciphertexts τ v are well-formed, i.e., that all components τ v,i are underlain by the same vector s v . 7. Finally, the signer generates a one-time signature otsig ← OTSign(otsk , (τ 1 , . . . , τ umax , y 0 , cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS , cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ )). The token is the tuple τ ← (τ 1 , . . . , τ umax , y 0 , cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS , cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ , otvk , otsig). VToken(mpk , τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ): The verifier checks that Verify ISIS (A, y 0 , cmt ISIS , G(y 0 cmt ISIS M ),
He accepts the token if all of these conditions hold, otherwise he rejects it. Open(msk , τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ): If VToken(mpk , τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ) = 0, then the manager returns ⊥.
Otherwise, for each v ∈ [u max ], the opener computes (
It returns the first v where CTInvert does not return ⊥ and ρ v ≤ (#R + 1)η √ m + n, or it returns ⊥ if no such v exists.
Theorem 6. The above AAT+R scheme is anonymous in the random oracle model if LWE is hard for Ψ = D Z m+n ,η and if OT S is existentially unforgeable under one-time chosen-message attack.
Proof (sketch). In the proof, we combine ideas from the security proof of [Pei09] and Theorem 4, so that we can answer opening queries adaptively, without losing anonymity for all users. The technique essentially uses the one-time signature scheme to reject mal-formed or "recycled" tokens to the opener. Furthermore, it allows inserting a challenge from the LWE problem into one of the encryption matrices B i,j and still be able decrypt via a trapdoor for any one of the other lattices. This makes the proof somewhat more involved than for the AAT-R scheme in Theorem 4; we refer to Appendix F for details.
Theorem 7. The above AAT+R scheme is traceable in the random oracle model if SIS(n, m + n, q, (2 max +1)η √ m + n+ O(n 1.5 )) is hard and the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard.
Proof (Sketch). The proof idea is largely the same as for the unforgeability of the AAT-R scheme (Theorem 5), i.e., the simulator reveals its internally generated GPV signatures for issue queries, but uses "fake" signatures and simulated BDD proofs to respond to token generation queries. However, this is complicated by the fact that responses to the opening oracle have to be consistent with "recycled" BDD proofs and honest for all other inputs. We refer to Appendix G for the full proof.
Extensions
Achieving Non-Frameability. For our AAT+R scheme, the group manager needs to be trusted not to frame users by generating tokens on their behalf and falsely hold the users responsible for the tokens. Many group signature schemes based on classical assumptions offer security against these type of attacks by offering non-frameabilty [BSZ05] . The GKV scheme, as of yet the only group signature scheme based on post-quantum assumptions, does not offer this property.
In this section we describe how we can obtain non-frameabilty for our construction. Due to space limitations, we only give a high-level description here. The main idea is to run a AAT+R and a AAT-R scheme in parallel. The schemes are then merged so that a token is only valid if it contains a valid token for both schemes. The AAT-R scheme ensures that users cannot be framed, while the AAT+R scheme ensures that tokens can be opened. We briefly sketch the necessary changes to merge the two schemes.
Each user u generates its own random matrix B u and generates its own master key pair (A u , T u ) for the AAT-R scheme based on B u . She then issues a credential cred u to herself with a single attribute with a fixed value. The matrices A u , B u become part of the scheme's public key, while cred u is the user's secret key. The manager then generates a public key (A, B 0 , B 1,0 , B 1,1 , . . . , B κ,0 , B κ,1 ) and corresponding secret key (T, S 0 ) for the AAT+R scheme. Attribute-containing credentialsĉred u are issued using the Issue algorithm of the AAT+R scheme.
The token generation and verification algorithms of both schemes are merged by combining the WI proofs for cred u andĉred u to prove that the signer knows short vectors α,α for the same index u, i.e., the language becomes
Results for Group Signatures. While our goal was to construct anonymous attribute token schemes, our results directly imply better lattice-based group signature schemes. As mentioned earlier, a group signature scheme can be seen as a special case of a AAT+R scheme with a single attribute with a fixed value. From our AAT+R scheme in Section 5, we obtain the first group signature scheme based on lattices that enjoys full anonymity, i.e., anonymity that is preserved under an attack where the adversary has access to an opening oracle. This form of anonymity is standard for group signatures [BMW03] but not achieved by the GKV scheme. Compared to their scheme, ours also has the advantage of shorter manager keys: both the public and the secret key are linear in the number of group members in the GKV scheme, versus constant in ours. When constructing a group signature scheme from the non-frameable AAT+R scheme sketched above, one furthermore obtains the first group signature based on lattices offering non-frameability.
Results for Ring Signatures. A ring signature scheme [RST01] lets users anonymously sign messages in name of ad-hoc groups, composed by the user at the time of signing. Lattice-based ring signatures can be built by letting each user generate matrices A u , B u , T u for our AAT-R scheme, self-issue a credential cred u with a single attribute with a fixed value, publish A u , B u as a public key and keep cred u as a signing key. To create a signature for a group of users U ⊆ [u max ], the user essentially generates a token for our AAT-R scheme using the language
Conclusion
We have provided the first full-blown lattice-based group signature scheme. In our scheme, the anonymity of honest users is also maintained after other users' signatures are opened and, in addition, it protect users against framing by a malicious group manager. Moreover, we have provided the first lattice-based anonymous attribute-based token systems (with and without anonymity revocation) as a major step towards anonymous credential systems. Extending these schemes to full-fledged anonymous credential systems seems possible but remains a challenging open problem.
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof (Proposition 2). Split matrices A = A 1 A 2 , B = B 1 B 2 , C = C 1 C 2 , and D = D 1 D 2 as above. The matrices A 1 , B 1 , B 2 , C 1 , C 2 , D 1 are uniformly random by definition or statistically close to uniform (via GPVGen). Moreover, we know that A 2 is distributed statistically close to uniform subject to
2 ) t . Equivalently, we can write
2 ) t , which is exactly how D 2 is constructed with respect to D 1 and C. As for the trapdoors, we argue that the T X 1 , for X ∈ {A, B, C, D}, are pairwise independent and follow the same distribution, namely the output distribution of GPVGen(1 n ). The extensions T X 2 = V X I n , for X ∈ {A, B, C, D}, are distributed uniformly random conditioned on the consistency requirement X 1 V X ≡ −X 2 in ExtBasis. Hence, both random variables are within negligible statistical distance.
B Proof of Theorem 3
We introduce the notion of a single-signer aggregate signature scheme, which can be seen as a restricted form of aggregate signatures [BGLS03] where only signatures by the same signer can be aggregated. The syntax of the key generation algorithm and signing algorithm are the same as for standard signatures. The aggregation algorithm Agg takes as input a public key pk , a list of messages M 1 , . . . , M , and a list of signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ of these messages under pk , and outputs an aggregate signature α. The aggregate verification algorithm AVerify, on input pk , messages M 1 , . . . , M , and aggregate α, returns 1 if α is deemed valid for M 1 , . . . , M under pk , and returns 0 if not.
Existential unforgeability is defined as for aggregate signatures: the adversary, given pk as input and access to a signing oracle, wins if it can output a forged aggregate α * on messages M * 1 , . . . , M * * so that AVerify(pk , α * , (M * 1 , . . . , M * * )) = 1 where at least one of the messages M * i was never queried to the signing oracle. The scheme we propose is parameterized with a maximum number max of signatures per aggregate. Key generation and signing are as for the GPV scheme, aggregation and verification are described below.
The scheme is correct due to the linearity of A. Let d ∞ := ηρ be the upper bound for the infinity norm of a single signature. Then, an -aggregate requires m log 2 ( d ∞ ) bits of storage, as opposed to m log 2 (d ∞ ) for individual GPV signatures. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 8. The above single-signer aggregate signature scheme is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model if the SIS(n, m, q, 2 max η √ m) problem is hard.
Proof. Given a forger A, we construct an algorithm B that solves the SIS problem as follows. On input A, B runs A on input A. Algorithm B keeps two associative arrays σ[·] and h[·]. We assume without loss of generality that A never makes the same random oracle or signing query twice, and that it always queries H(M ) before querying a signature on M or before using M in its forgery. When A makes a random oracle query Eventually, A outputs its forgery α * for messages
For x = α * − α we therefore have that Ax ≡ 0 and by the triangle inequality that x 2 ≤ 2 * η √ m. Moreover, there is at least one message M * i that A did not query to the signing oracle. Therefore, A's view is independent of σ[M * i ], so with overwhelming probability 1 − 1/2 ω(n) , α * = α, and hence x = 0, so that x is a valid solution to the SIS problem.
C Lyubashevsky's Identification Scheme
In this section, we present a generalization of Lyubashevsky's identification scheme [Lyu08a] . Let n, m, q be parameters as per Section 2 and let A be a matrix that is shared by all users. In the original, the prover possesses a secret key x ∈ {0, 1} m and an associated public key y ← Ax mod q. Using x she can compute a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge of a short vector x ∈ Z m such that Ax ≡ y and x 2 ≤ 10(m + n)
Our setting is different for two reasons. First, we work over Z m+n instead of over Z m . Second, our secret keys x are distributed according to D Z m+n ,η with x ∞ ≤ ηρ(m) =: d. As a consequence, the entire protocol needs to be modified. However, we stay as close as possible to the original protocol and leave especially soundness and completeness errors unchanged. Hence, the proofs of witness-indistinguishability, soundness, and completeness stay conceptually the same. Refer to Figure 1 for the protocol details.
Notice that we did not attempt to optimize the scheme for efficiency, but it is easy to transfer it into the ideal lattice setting in analogy to [Lyu09, Rüc10a] . There, the efficiency improvements of [Lyu08b, Rüc10b] apply. Now we briefly sketch the analysis of the scheme, focusing on the differences from the original construction.
Resp ISIS (x, st, chISIS):
If d ≥ 0.65t then return 1 else return 0 . Fig. 1 . Generalization of Lyubashevsky's identification scheme with parameter t = ω(log n), public key (A, y), and secret key x.
Completeness. Observe that for all z i = ⊥, we always have Az i ≡ A(r i +ch ISIS,i x) = s i +ch ISIS,i y as desired. For reasonable k = m + n and for (φ, A, B) = (5, d, 5kA) , the following simple lemma from [Rüc10b] establishes Prob[ z i ∞ ≥ 0.81] as in [Lyu08a] .
Since all z i are independent, the Chernoff bound gives Prob[
Hence, for t = ω(log(n)), we achieve a negligible completeness error.
Witness-indistinguishability First of all, we need that for essentially all secret keys x there is a second (valid) key x such that Ax ≡ Ax . A simple counting argument shows that all but at most q n secret keys admit such a collision, but there are (2d + 1) m+n possible secret keys. Hence, the probability of choosing a non-colliding key is 2 −Ω(n log(n)) . Let x and x be such a pair of colliding keys with public key y. The particular choice the secret key is statistically hidden by y and the adversary's challenge ch ISIS = (ch ISIS,i ) t i=1 is independent of that choice. The same holds for cmt ISIS = (s i ) t i= ; each s i statistically hides the underlying randomness r i . However, the response rsp ISIS = (z i ) t i=1 is sensitive to the secret key, as z i ← r i + ch ISIS,i x.
To show that the protocol is statistically witness-indistinguishable, we need to be able to switch from x to x without changing the output behavior. To this end, we define r i ← z i − ch ISIS,i x and z i ← r i +ch ISIS,i x for all i. Observe that z i = z i and that
Soundness. We sketch how a short lattice vector is extracted from a cheating adversary. We explicitly exploit witness-indistinguishability to (honestly) answer the adversary's prover queries. Hence, we pick a secret key x, run the adversary on input (A, y) with y ← Ax mod q, and answer all queries honestly. During the adversary's impersonation attempt, we choose a uniformly random challenge vector ch
and receive the response rsp
. Then, we rewind the adversary to the challenge phase of the protocol, send a fresh set
uniformly at random, and receive rsp
. We need that there is an index j such that ch √ m + n and Ax ≡ 0 as desired. Let us assume that the adversary has a non-negligible success probability . As shown in [Lyu08a, Theorem 13], such an index j exists with non-negligible probability at least 2 − 2 −t/18 because with probability at least 1 − 2 −t/18 , the hamming distance of ch ISIS is large enough to guarantee this "overlap" of both executions by the Chernoff bound.
D Full Proof of Theorem 4
We define a sequence of games with Game-1 being the anonymity experiment for b = 0 and Game-8 being the same experiment with b = 1. We prove the theorem by showing indistinguishability between each pair of subsequent games.
In Game-1, the experiment chooses B ← $ Z n×(m+n) q and generates (A, T) ← OrthoSamp(B). It then runs the adversary A on input mpk = A, msk = (A, T), and common reference string B. At the end of the first phase, A outputs user indices
, R, M ) and hands it to A. All random oracle queries, including the internal queries spawned by generating τ * , are responded with truly random values. The latter outputs a bit b and wins the game if b = 0.
In Game-2, the experiment generates τ * by choosing a random vector b ← $ Z m+n q , setting y ← Ab mod q, computing x ← GPVInvert(A, T, y, η), computing a random (long) vector α u 1 such that Aα u 1 ≡ i∈R H(u 1 i a u 1 ,i ), and setting τ u 1 ← b +α u 1 mod q. Otherwise, the signature generation proceeds as prescribed by the GenToken algorithm using the vector x computed earlier, i.e., using the short vectors σ u 0 ,i included in cred u 0 to compute τ u 0 and using
Claim. If the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard, then Game-1 and Game-2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Given an adversary A that distinguishes Game-1 from Game-2, we build a distinguisher D that, on input B, b, decides whether b is a random vector or was generated as b ← B t s+e mod q with s ← $ Z n q and e ∼ Ψ . On inputs B, b, algorithm D runs (A, T) ← OrthoSamp(B). It then runs A on inputs A, (A, T) with common reference string B. When A outputs u 0 , u 1 ,
, R, and M , algorithm D generates the token τ * as done in Game-2 using the vector b. It is clear that when b is random, then A's view is identical to Game-2, while if b was generated as B t s + e, then it is identical to Game-1.
Game-3 is identical to Game-2, except that the short vector α u 1 ← i∈R σ u 1 ,i taken from cred u 1 is used to generate τ u 1 ← b+α u 1 mod q. Token generation remains unchanged otherwise. Since b is a uniformly random vector, Game-3 is information-theoretically indistinguishable from Game-2.
In Game-4, the challenge token is generated using a random x ∼ Ψ and y ← Ax mod q. Moreover, τ u 1 is computed as τ u 1 ← B t s u 1 + α u 1 + x mod q. Notice that now short vectors σ u 0 , σ u 1 are being used for both of τ u 0 , τ u 1 , but that cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ are still generated with (u 0 , s u 0 ) as a witness. Game-4 is computationally indistinguishable from Game-3 under the assumption that the LWE problem w.r.t. Ψ is hard by a similar argument as made for Game-1 and Game-2.
Game-5 is identical to Game-4, except that the BDD proof is generated as (cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ ) ← P BDD ((B, τ v ) umax v=1 , u 1 , s u 1 ). This game hop is indistinguishable by the witness-indistinguishability of (cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ ).
The rest of the game hops are essentially the same as the previous ones, but in reverse order. In Game-6, a random vector b ← $ Z m+n is chosen to set y ← Ab mod q and x ← GPVInvert(A, T, y, η). Token generation proceeds as in Game-5, but τ u 0 is generated as τ u 0 ← b + α u 0 . This game hop is indistinguishable under the decisional LWE assumption. In Game-7, τ u 0 is generated using a random long vectorα u 0 instead of the short vector α u 0 . The game hop is information-theoretically indistinguishable due to the randomness of b. Finally, Game-8 is a real attack with τ * generated via cred u 1 . It is indistinguishable from Game-7 under the LWE assumption by a similar argument as made for Game-1 and Game-2.
E Full Proof of Theorem 5
We show how a traceability adversary A gives rise to a solver B for the SIS problem. We do so by converting A into an algorithm C that can be rewound in Bellare-Neven's generalization [BN06] of Pointcheval-Stern's forking lemma [PS00] . We then show that the forking algorithm F C can be converted into the SIS solver B.
Consider algorithm C that on input A ∈ Z n×(m+n) q
and random values g 1 , . . . , g q G ∈ {0, 1} t runs (B, S) ← OrthoSamp(A). Algorithm C then runs A on input mpk = A and with common reference string B, responding to its H(H i ) queries by selecting σ i ∼ D Z m+n ,η and responding with Aσ i mod q, keeping a list (H i , σ i ). When responding to A's i-th query G(G i ), the algorithm answers with g i while maintaining a list of tuples (i, G i , g i ). Queries F(F i ) are simply responded to using random strings. (Without loss of generality, we assume that A never makes the same random oracle query twice.) When A makes an initialization query for u with attributes (a i ) i=1 , C simulates queries H(u i a i ), causing the random oracle to be programmed as described above. When A makes an issue query for user u, it looks up tuples (u i a i , σ u,i ) in the list for the attributes a i with which u was initialized and returns cred u = (u, (σ u,i ) i=1 ).
When A requests a token by user u, C chooses x ∼ D Z m+n ,η and computes y, cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS as in the real GenToken algorithm. It then generates τ v using a long vectorα v for all v ∈ [u max ], i.e., it chooses a randomα v ∈ Z m+n q such that Aα v ≡ i H(v i a i ) using Gauss elimination, chooses
), programs random oracle F so that F(cmt ∨ ) = ch ∨ , and returns the token τ ← (τ 1 , . . . , τ umax , y, cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS , cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ ).
The environment that C provides to A is indistinguishable from a real attack environment. Namely, mpk and the common reference string are correctly distributed by Proposition 2 and credentials returned by the issuing oracle are correctly distributed as per the properties of GPVInvert. The simulated tokens are computationally indistinguishable from the ones generated by GenToken if the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard by a similar argument as used in the claim showing indistinguishability between Game-1 and Game-2 in the proof of Theorem 4 above.
Eventually, A outputs its forgery τ * = (τ * 1 , . . . , τ * umax , y * , cmt * ISIS , rsp * ISIS , cmt * ∨ , rsp * ∨ ) on message M * and attributes (a * i ) i∈R * for R * . If the token is invalid, C returns (0, ⊥). Algorithm C then computes (s v , ρ v ) ← LWEInvert(B, S, τ * v ) for v ∈ [u max ] until it finds an index u * for which ρ u * 2 ≤ (#R * + 1)η √ m + n. By the soundness of P ∨-pBDD , at least one such index must exist. (Note that the adversary cannot have reused a simulated proof cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ from one of the responses of the token generation oracle, since the forgery has to be on a different set of attributes or a different message than any of the requested tokens, and therefore ch ∨ as generated through F will be a different random value.) Next, C looks up the index i * of A's query G(y * cmt * ISIS M * ) = ch * ISIS , which, without loss of generality, can be assumed to exist. It also looks up entries (u * i a * i , σ i ) in the list associated to H for i ∈ R * and computes α ← i∈R * σ i . Algorithm C returns (i * , (α, ρ u * , y * , cmt * ISIS , ch * ISIS , rsp * ISIS )). The forking lemma of [BN06] says that if C returns (i * , τ * ) with i * = 0 with non-negligible probability, then the forking algorithm F C will with non-negligible probability return (1, τ (1) , τ (2) ) based on two executions of C that are identical up to the i * -th query to G, and where the responses to the i * -th query in both executions are different.
Consider now the SIS solving algorithm B that, on input A, runs F C (A) to obtain (1, τ (1) , τ (2) ).
Since the two executions of C are identical up to the i * -th query to G, the arguments to the i * -th query to G are also identical in both executions, and hence we have that y (1) = y (2) =: y and cmt
ISIS . Since the responses to the i * -th query are different, we have that ch
ISIS . By the rewinding argument of Lemma 1 in Appendix C, which is a generalization of [Lyu08a] [Theorem 13], we can extract a vector x ← Ext ISIS (cmt
By the definition of a successful adversary, we know that at A's view must be independent from at least one of the vectors σ u * ,i underlying random oracle queries H(u * i a * i ), either because user u * was never corrupted, or because u * was initialized with a different attribute a i . Remember that token generation queries are responded without using σ u * ,i , so these do not leak any information about σ u * ,i . Since also P ISIS is witness-indistinguishable, we can apply the same technique as in the proof of Theorem 3 and conclude that with overwhelming probability z = α (1) − α is a non-zero vector with Az ≡ 0, where α is an appropriate aggregate of the σ u * ,i vectors. Furthermore, we can conclude that
F Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We define a sequence of games with the first game being the anonymity experiment for b = 0 and the last being the same experiment with b = 1. We prove the theorem by showing indistinguishability between each pair of subsequent games.
Game-1 is the real game with b = 0. In Game-2, the experiment generates the key pair otvk * , otsk * to be used in the challenge token τ * at the very beginning of the game. If at any point during the game the opening oracle is queried on a token τ with otvk = otvk * , then it returns ⊥. It is straightforward to show that any difference between Game-1 and Game-2 gives rise to a forger for OT S.
In Game-3, the component τ * u 1 in the challenge token is replaced with a random element
. The vector y * 0 is set to y * 0 ← Ab 0 − H(u 1 i a i ), and the proof (cmt * ISIS , rsp * ISIS ) is computed using x * ← GPVInvert(A, T, y, η). Otherwise, τ * is generated as in the real GenToken algorithm with u 1 as a signer.
Claim. If the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard, then Game-2 and Game-3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Given an adversary A that distinguishes Game-2 from Game-3, we build a distinguisher D that, on input matrix B ∈ Z n×(κ+1)(m+n) q and vector b ∈ Z (κ+1)(m+n) q , decides whether b is a random vector or was generated as b ← Bs + e mod q with s ← $ Z n q and e ∼ Ψ .
. It then runs A on input mpk = (A, B 0 , B 1,0 , B 1,1 , . . . , B κ,0 , B κ,1 ) . It responds to random oracle queries with random elements from appropriate domains, and responds to issuing queries via the real Issue algorithm using trapdoor T.
It responds to opening queries for a token τ as follows. If the token is invalid or otvk = otvk * , it returns ⊥. Else, let i be such that
] and all j ∈ {0, . . . , κ} then it returns the smallest index v for which ρ v 2 ≤ (#R + 1)η √ m + n, which by the soundness of P ∨-pBDD must exist. Else, it returns ⊥.
The challenge token τ * is generated as in Game-3 with vector b taking the place of τ * u 1 . One can verify that A's environment is exactly as in Game-2 if b was generated as b ← Bs+e mod q, and exactly as in Game-3 if it is random. Any adversary A distinguishing between both games will therefore allow D to win the LWE game.
The rest of the proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4. Namely, in Game-4, τ u 1 ,0 is generated as b 0 + α u 1 mod q for a short vector α u 1 . By the randomness of b, Game-4 is information-theoretically indistinguishable from Game-3. In Game-5, τ u 1 is generated as τ u 1 ,0 ← B t 0 s u 1 + αu 1 + x 0 mod q using a random x 0 ∼ Ψ and y 0 ← Ax 0 mod q. It is indistinguishable from Game-6 by a similar argument as made in the above claim. In Game-6, s u 1 is used a witness in the generation of cmt * ∨ , rsp * ∨ ; the witness-indistinguishability of P ∨-pBDD guarantees the indistinguishability of this game hop. In the subsequent games, the same steps are taken in reverse order as for the previous games, gradually moving to having τ * entirely generated by u 1 , as done in the proof of Theorem refthm:aat:anonymity.
G Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We show how a traceability adversary A gives rise to a solver B for the SIS problem. We do so by converting A into an algorithm C that can be rewound in Bellare-Neven's generalization [BN06] of Pointcheval-Stern's forking lemma [PS00] . We then show that the forking algorithm F C can be converted into the SIS solver B.
and random values g 1 , . . . , g q G ∈ {0, 1} t runs (B 0 , S 0 ) ← OrthoSamp(A) and chooses uniform matrices B i,b for i ∈ [κ] and b ∈ {0, 1}. Algorithm C then runs A on input mpk = (A, B 0 , B 1,0 , B 1,1 , . . . , B κ,0 , B κ,1 ), responding to its H(H i ) queries by selecting σ i ∼ D Z m+n ,η and responding with Aσ i mod q, keeping a list (H i , σ i ). When responding to A's i-th query G(G i ), the algorithm answers with g i while maintaining a list of tuples (i, G i , g i ). Queries F(F i ) are simply responded to using random strings. (Without loss of generality, we assume that A never makes the same random oracle query twice.) When A makes an initialization query for u with attributes (a i ) i=1 , C simulates queries H(u i a i ), causing the random oracle to be programmed as described above. When A makes an issue query for user u, it looks up tuples (u i a i , σ u,i ) in the list for the attributes a i with which u was initialized and returns cred u = (u, (σ u,i ) i=1 ).
When A requests a token by user u, C chooses x 0 ∼ D Z m+n ,η and computes y 0 , cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS as in the real GenToken algorithm. It then generates τ v,0 using a long vectorα v for all v ∈ [u max ], i.e., it chooses a randomα v ∈ Z m+n q such that Aα v ≡ i H(v i a i ) using Gauss elimination, chooses s v ← $ Z n q and computes τ v,0 ← B t 0 s v +α v + x 0 mod q. It also generates (otvk , otsk ) ← OTKeygen(1 n ), chooses x v,i ∼ Ψ and computes τ v,i ← B t i,otvk i s v + x v,i mod q as in the real token generation algorithm. It then simulates a proof (cmt ∨ , ch ∨ , rsp ∨ ) ← S ∨-pBDD ((B, τ v ) umax v=1 ), by programming the random oracle F so that F(B otvk (τ v ) umax v=1 cmt ∨ (a i ) i=1 R M ) = ch ∨ . Finally, she computes the one-time signature otsig using otsk and returns the token τ ← (τ 1 , . . . , τ umax , y 0 , cmt ISIS , rsp ISIS , cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ , otvk , otsig).
When A submits an opening query (τ, R, (a i ) i∈R , M ), algorithm C first verifies τ using VToken. If it is invalid, C returns ⊥. If the non-interactive proof cmt, rsp in τ was recycled from a previous response to a token generation request, then C returns the user index u of that token generation request. Otherwise, it returns the result of the real Open algorithm using S 0 .
The environment that C provides to A is indistinguishable from a real attack environment. Namely, A and B 0 are correctly distributed by Proposition 2 and credentials returned by the issuing oracle are correctly distributed as per the properties of GPVInvert. The simulated tokens are computationally indistinguishable from generated by GenToken if the decision LWE problem with noise distribution Ψ is hard by a similar argument as used in the claim showing indistinguishability between Game-1 and Game-2 in the proof of Theorem 4. The responses to opening queries are correctly distributed since the only responses that differ from those of the real Open algorithm are tokens involving a simulated proof (cmt, rsp), for which the user index for which they were created is returned.
Eventually, A outputs its forgery τ * = (τ * 1 , . . . , τ * umax , y * 0 , cmt * ISIS , rsp * ISIS , cmt * ∨ , rsp * ∨ , otvk * , otsig * ) on message M * and attributes (a * i ) i∈R * for R * . If the token is invalid, C returns (0, ⊥).
If the non-interactive proof cmt * ∨ , rsp * ∨ was recycled from a previously generated token, then this cannot be a valid forgery, since the same vectors τ 1 , . . . , τ umax will always open to the same user u, and since the revealed attributes (a * i ) i∈R * and the message M * must also be the same as when the token was generated as these are included in the random oracle argument of ch ∨ = F(B otvk (τ v ) umax v=1 cmt ∨ (a i ) i=1 R M ), rsp ∨ ). Otherwise, let u * = Open(msk , τ * , R * , (a * i ) i∈R * , M * ). Since the token is valid and cmt ∨ , rsp ∨ is not a recycled simulated proof, by the soundness of P ∨-pBDD we have that u * = ⊥. Algorithm C then computes (s u * , ρ u * ) ← LWEInvert(B 0 , S 0 , τ * u * ,0 ). Next, C looks up the index i * of A's query G(y * cmt * ISIS M * ) = ch * ISIS , which, without loss of generality, can be assumed to exist. It also looks up entries (u * i a * i , σ i ) in the list associated to H for i ∈ R * and computes α ← i∈R * σ i . Algorithm C returns (i * , (α, ρ u * , y * , cmt * ISIS , ch * ISIS , rsp * ISIS )).
The forking lemma of [BN06] says that if C returns (i * , τ * ) with i * = 0 with non-negligible probability, then the forking algorithm F C will with non-negligible probability return (1, τ (1) , τ (2) ) based on two executions of C that are identical up to the i * -th query to G, and where the responses to the i * -th query in both executions are different.
Consider now the SIS solving algorithm B that, on input A, runs F C (A) to obtain (1, τ (1) , τ (2) ). Let τ (1) = (α (1) , ρ (1) , y (1) , cmt Since the two executions of C are identical up to the i * -th query to G, the arguments to the i * -th query to G are also identical in both executions, and hence we have that y (1) = y (2) =: y and cmt
(1)
ISIS . Since the responses to the i * -th query are different, we have that ch By the definition of a successful adversary, we know that at A's view must be independent from at least one of the vectors σ u * ,i underlying random oracle queries H(u * i a * i ), either because user u * was never corrupted, or because u * was initialized with a different attribute a i . Remember that token generation queries are responded without using σ u * ,i , so these do not leak any information about σ u * ,i . Since also P ISIS is witness-indistinguishable, we can apply the same technique as in the proof of Theorem 3 and conclude that with overwhelming probability z = α (1) − α is a non-zero vector with Az ≡ 0 and z 2 ≤ ( max + 1)η √ m + n + O(n 1.5 ) + max η √ m ≤ (2 max + 1)η √ m + n + O(n 1.5 ).
